

Pre-Analysis Plan

**The Burden of Proof: Barriers to Women in Party Controlled Candidate Selection**

Melanie L. Phillips<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:**

There remains limited understanding of the challenges women politicians face when navigating entry into politics in the world's newest democracies. Much of the existing scholarship draws on women's political experiences in countries with formal candidate selection processes, whether voter-controlled systems such as the United States or party-based mechanisms as in most of Western Europe. However, this can result in biased inferences about why relatively few women decide to run for political office and even fewer are successful in making it onto the ballot. The reality for candidates in most new democracies is that they are not selected through formal primary processes. Instead, parties in countries that transitioned to multiparty politics through the Third Wave still tend to select candidates for office through opaque selection processes. In this context of informal party-controlled candidate selection, I study the preferences of party selectorates, the strategies women employ when entering politics, and the barriers they face in securing a party's nomination.

In my dissertation, I argue that party selectorates, the party officials involved in candidate selection from the national to the constituency levels, systematically discriminate against potential women candidates due to the nature of patronage relationships and network connections. These factors can affect women candidates in advanced industrialized countries, but they take on magnified significance in democratizing countries where candidate selection is a closed party-controlled process. While women may still confront the barriers oft-cited in the literature—e.g., voter discrimination—there are obstacles unique to these informal processes that have been overlooked in the existing scholarship.

Here I present a pre-analysis plan for the survey experimental component of this project. The survey will be conducted on randomly selected party members and aspirants from the 2016 election in Zambia. It will explore how party selectorates evaluate women aspirants and whether the preferences of party officials systematically vary at different levels of the party. Moreover, it will investigate whether aspirants believe these preferences exist. By experimentally varying gender along with important attributes such as a candidate's financial and organizational capacity, the survey will establish whether or not the burden of proof falls on women candidates in party-controlled candidate selection systems that makes running for office difficult and costly.

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<sup>1</sup> PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley:  
melaniephillips@berkeley.edu

## 1. Introduction:

How do women candidates navigate informal candidate selection processes in new democracies? While the number of women in elected positions has been slowly increasing over time, there is limited understanding of the unique decisions and challenges they face in countries where democratic institutions remain weak. Much of the existing scholarship draws on the experiences of women entering politics in countries across North America and Western Europe, where primaries are formal and decisions are public. The reality for candidates in many new democracies, however, is that candidate selection occurs through opaque processes.<sup>2</sup>

Few studies have examined the experience of women in the candidate selection processes of Africa's newest democracies.<sup>3</sup> To understand the strategies women employ when entering politics, my dissertation examines the role of party gatekeepers as barriers to the selection of women in party-controlled candidate nominations. I argue that barriers are magnified for women by the variation in informal selection criteria used by party gatekeepers at different levels. Specifically, I claim that party members at the local level, who tend to have the same socioeconomic standard of living as the general population in a poor country, are highly motivated to select candidates who can engage in bribery or kickbacks. At the national level, party members, who tend to come from the richest strata of society, prefer to select candidates who have a demonstrated capacity to mobilize people through organizational networks. Women who seek political office must demonstrate that they can satisfy both criteria.

Both male and female candidates must satisfy the informal selection criteria at local and national levels. However, women must *visibly* demonstrate that they can satisfy the financial and network expectations of party gatekeepers in a way that men do not. Significant burden of proof is placed on women candidates that is not required of male candidates. For example, while all candidates are expected to financially support their campaigns, for male candidates signaling this simply means being able to pay party dues and adoption fees. Party gatekeepers require additional proof that a women's wealth is sufficient for the campaign and more importantly, that she has direct control of this wealth (i.e., the wealth is not under her husband or male relative's control). This gendered expectation generally means that women candidates face greater cost in competing for nomination because they must either demonstrate this wealth during the candidate selection process or have it displayed in the constituency through local businesses.

I developed this argument through an extensive study of party nomination processes and women's entry into politics with multiple rounds of fieldwork in Zambia, totaling over 7 months in the country. I have conducted over 90 interviews with both failed and successful Zambian candidates, members of parliament, party activists, party leaders, and local political NGO's. In addition to interviews, I collected candidate selection records (i.e. a list of who applied and who was selected) and candidate recommendations. These documents and qualitative interviews built the theoretical argument grounding the project.

To further support this argument, I conduct two surveys with party members who participated in candidate selection for members of parliament and aspirants from the 2016 general elections.

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<sup>2</sup> e.g. Chile (Siavelis, 2002), Croatia (Kasapović, 2001), and Portugal (Leston-Bandeira & Freire, 2003)

<sup>3</sup> Notable exceptions have been Bauer (2010) who highlighted that the promotion of political equity is still not a priority among political parties, and Ichino and Nathan (2016) who show that expanding the number of people involved in candidate selection increases the opportunities for previously marginalized individuals.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

Drawing on multiple months of fieldwork, I build upon the existing scholarship on barriers to women's candidacy in order to identify the effects of party-controlled primaries in developing countries. I theorize that the closed nature of party-controlled candidate selection in countries like Zambia magnifies the disadvantages women already face in politics. Specifically, a woman's gender becomes a more salient factor through committee deliberations, as selectorates debate which individual they should endorse as the party candidate. Women in developing countries often stand out as different due to their presence in politics being a relatively recent occurrence. Therefore, assumptions being made about a female candidate, especially by party members and leaders, are that of an outsider (Judd & Park, 1988). Discussed by Niven (1998) as the outgroup effect, there is a tendency to view an outgroup as less qualified than the in-group one associates themselves. Furthermore, calculations of individual benefit are considered hand-in-hand in candidate selection processes that are saturated with vote buying and offers of patronage.

### *Gender Bias*

Based on my interviews with candidates and party officials, it seems likely that gendered stereotypes become more salient as selectorates discuss candidate qualifications behind a committee's closed doors. Scholars have long established that men and women who enter politics are evaluated differently. Gender is a common heuristic that voters use to evaluate candidates and the stereotypes associated with each gender shades the lenses through which individuals judge political aspirants. These stereotypes extend to perceptions of qualifications and decisions on the behalf of the party leaders. Gender bias in party recruiters, scholars have argued, is one of the main drivers of inequality in political representation in the United States (Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Niven, 1998).

In addition to outright gender bias, women candidates often recount having to accomplish more to appear equally credible. Often discussed when looking at the equal election win rates between men and women (Lawless & Fox, 2010), researchers have shown the women candidates are often more qualified but only winning at equivalent rates to their lesser qualified male companions. This finding, however, has largely been based in the American context and has not been supported, or widely investigated, in other countries (Black & Erickson, 2003).

Therefore, this project will test the following to general hypotheses on biases against women candidates:

**H1:** Women candidates are less likely to be selected than male candidates.

**H2:** Women candidates are asked to meet higher qualifications than male candidates.

## ***Financial Resources***

Financial Resources are a crucial component in elections, and especially in Africa, where candidates are largely responsible for supporting their own campaigns and often asked to give financially to their constituents if elected, it is clear that considering a candidate's financial capacity is a key part in candidate evaluation. My interviews revealed that selectorates are often offered resources—cash, goods, favors—in exchange for their support during the candidate selection process. Recent work has shown that increasing the number of people in a selectorate can weaken the effect of patronage and thus open opportunities for women to contend in primaries (Ichino & Nathan, 2016). Nevertheless, clientelism still remains a persistent and pervasive component in informal selection-based primaries, especially for women in developing countries who have limited access to formal credit or opportunities to build up assets. Women, therefore, have limited means to engage in the clientelistic games that surround candidate selection.

Further, party selectorates highlighted during my interviews that while they have the same ideal attributes of their preferred political candidates, the ways in which a candidate meets those qualifications is affected by the candidate's gender. Given the patriarchal norms in relationship dynamics, the history of property rights, and inheritance laws, it is expected that a man owns the resources of his family, whereas a woman may not. Party gatekeepers require additional proof that a women's wealth is sufficient for the campaign and more importantly, that she has direct control of this wealth (i.e., the wealth is not under her husband or male relative's control). For example, if a man's family has a business or property it is assumed to be his property, whereas a woman who comes from a wealthy family is not credited for that resource unless she can visibly display the good to the committee by highlighting it or distributing it. This can come in the form of driving an expensive car to the interview or in other, potentially costly, displays of wealth.

Selectorates at the lower level, who tend to have the same socioeconomic standard of living as the general population, are highly motivated to select candidates who can engage in bribes or kickbacks. Further, they prioritize connections to locally based identity and leadership and are often less educated and more engaged in the preservation of traditional norms and gender roles.

Therefore, this project will test the following hypotheses on the role of financial resources in the evaluation of women candidates:

**H3:** Women candidates are more likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they have *greater* financial resources.

**H4:** Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not display independent *control* of their financial resources.

**H5:** Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not *visibly* display their financial resources.

**H6:** Local party members are more likely to prioritize financial resources when evaluating candidates compared to national party members

## ***Organizational Capacities***

My interviews in Zambia indicate that women are less likely to be connected to party selectorates. Indeed, the literature on networks shows that men dominate elite political networks (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2013). There is little cross-gender interaction within networks, suggesting that women's networks are less likely to bridge into these elite political networks (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009). Additionally, scholars contend that women enjoy less access to clientelism than men and are thus less likely to become political power brokers.

As highlighted above with the financial resources, the ways in which a male candidate and a female candidate may demonstrate their organizational capacities, I contend, are measured and evaluated differently. A man's membership into elite networks may simply be assumed by his personal connection in a way that a woman would have to visibly demonstrate. Further, demonstrating that these networks could be utilized during the campaign period may be further scrutinized for women candidates, where party members note they assume individuals are less likely to come out and support them.

Lastly, at the national level, party members, who tend to come from the richest strata of society, prefer to select candidates who have a demonstrated mobilization capacity through organizational networks. Unlike the local party members, who can greatly benefit from the financial resources of a candidate, national party members are likely to be the most benefitted through connections that can both help the party during the election period. but also, personally help them and their endeavors.

Therefore, this project will test the following hypotheses on the role of organizational capacities in the evaluation of women candidates:

**H7:** Women candidates are more likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they have *greater* organizational capacities.

**H8:** Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not *visibly* display their organizational resources.

**H9:** Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not display independent *control* of their organizational capacities.

**H10:** National party members are more likely to prioritize organizational capacities when evaluating candidates compared to local party members

### 3. Research Design

The surveys are being conducted on tablets by Zambian enumerators throughout the country from June to December 2019. Enumerators will be sent to each of the ten provinces with an estimated sample of 2,000 party members and 900 aspirants

The surveys ask participants questions to gauge political experience, candidate preferences, measures of ambivalent sexism, and financial expectations during the multiple phases of candidate selection. Experimentally, the surveys employ two different designs to assess my hypotheses. The first asks participants for recommendations on how candidates could improve their chances in the 2021 election. The gender of the theoretical candidates will be randomized. The survey asks participants to recommend what groups the candidates should belong to, how much money they should have for the elections, what assets they need to own, and what experience they need to have. The intuition is that we should see variation in the recommendations given to male versus female candidates with greater financial and organizational demands placed on the latter.

The second survey utilizes a conjoint design to present candidate recommendations.<sup>4</sup> The recommendations vary the gender of the candidate, the financial capacity of the candidate, and the organizational capacity of the candidate.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the conjoint varies marital status and party endorsement. With these recommendations, participants are asked to score the candidate and to provide recommendations on what the candidate needs to do to be selected. Again, I expect significant variation in the scores and recommendations of male and female candidates. Further, I expect that local level party members will score candidates more highly that have proven financial capacity, whereas national level party members will score candidates more highly that have proven organizational capacity. Lastly, women candidates, I expect, will only receive credit for attributes in which they control (i.e. are not family owned but personally owned) and are visible.

### 4. Sample and Case Selection

Zambia is an ideal case for exploring the barriers to female candidacy in developing countries. Zambia broadly has many of the relevant political and demographic factors that characterize similarly situated countries: it has high ethnic diversity, inconsistent patterns of economic growth, and relatively weak parties. Further, while some countries have seen significant increases in the percentages of women holding political office due to the adoption of gender-based quotas, Zambia does not have a quota system and therefore women must compete for political office without any institutional or party incentives. Therefore, the findings from this study will allow us to better understand the likely constraints women will continue to face in expanding their representation in developing countries where parties select their candidates through closed processes.

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<sup>4</sup> These candidate recommendations are based on actual recommendations that each level of the party structure writes and submits to the province and the national executive committee after interviewing candidates during the candidate selection period, ensuring that each participant is familiar with the task being asked.

<sup>5</sup> Financial Capacity refers to the candidate's ability to fund their campaign, and general wealth, whereas organizational capacity refers to the candidate's networks, connections, and ability to mobilize support. Within financial and organizational capacity, the survey will randomize whether the attribute is a visible or none visible attribute and whether or not the candidate has control over the capacity. Visibility refers to the additional cost that comes in exhibiting this attribute in order to prove one's capacity and control refers to whether or not it is a personal attribute of a family attribute.

The survey samples across the country, selecting constituencies in each of the countries 10 provinces. The constituencies were selected to represent all constituencies where any of the following occurred in 2016: no women applied, a woman applied but was not selected, a woman was selected but not elected, and a woman was elected. Not all types of constituencies exist in each of the provinces. The constituencies selected can be seen in Appendix A. In each constituency, the sample is estimated to be 200 party selectorates (100 from the incumbent party Patriotic Front and 100 from the opposition party United Party for National Development) and 50 aspirants. Aspirants are selected from a list of aspirants from the 2016 election collected during a previous round of fieldwork and the order will be randomized.

## **5. Dependent Variables**

The dependent variables being studied in this survey are participant recommendations, evaluations, and selection of potential candidates. I argue that *ceteris paribus* women candidates will receive more costly recommendations, harsher evaluations, and be less likely to be selected as a candidate for office as reflected in the hypotheses laid out in the theoretical framework section.

### ***5.1 Recommendations***

The first experimental component of the survey examines what recommendations the survey participants give to hypothetical candidates. Each participant will only see one hypothetical candidate.

#### **Question Setup:**

This section shows you an individual who is considering applying to be the member of parliament in [*The participant's constituency*] for 2021. We would like for you to give them advice on how to be a better candidate to increase their chances of being selected in [*The participant's constituency*] Their last name has been removed for anonymity.

#### **Vignette:**

Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert is thinking about applying for adoption in [*The participant's constituency*] for [*The participant's Political Party*]. This is her/his first time applying for adoption for a member of parliament and she/he would like to know what you would recommend to increase her/his chances of being selected and winning the election. Please think about what type of candidate you think would be the most successful in [*The participant's constituency*].

Measures:

1. Q40/Q52:  
What level of education should Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [*The participant's constituency*]?
2. Q41-42/Q53-54:  
What level of political experience should Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [*The participant's constituency*]? Check all then select most important.
3. Q43-44/Q55-56:  
What sources of support should Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate [*The participant's constituency*]? Check all then select most important.
4. Q45/Q57:  
What would be the ideal family situation for Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [*The participant's constituency*]?
5. Q46/Q58:  
How much money would you advise Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert to save to fund his/her campaign for Member of Parliament in [*The participant's constituency*]?
6. Q47-48/Q59-60:  
What assets do you think Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert needs before running for Member of Parliament in [*The participant's constituency*] in order to be a successful female/male aspirant? Check all then select most important.
7. Q49-50/Q61-62:  
What organizations should Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert join before running for Member of Parliament in [*The participant's constituency*] that might make him/her better connected and supported during the adoption process and campaign? Check all then select most important.

## ***5.2 Evaluations and Selection***

The second experimental section of the survey uses a conjoint design to investigate participant evaluations of hypothetical candidates. The survey presents the participant with a hypothetical candidate profile generated from the attributes and attribute values presented in Table 1. These profiles resemble actual candidate profiles that selectorates receive and evaluate during the candidate selection period

Question Setup:

We have received some descriptions of potential aspirants for your constituency. We would like to know your opinion on the quality of these applicants for a member of parliament for the 2021 election in [*The participant's constituency*]. Please imagine that you are on the selection committee and have been given the following information on the candidate for the member of parliament for your constituency. There will be 6 different candidates.

Measures:

1. How would you rate [*Gender Attribute - Name*] as a candidate for Member of Parliament for [*The participant's constituency*] constituency? (Q66<sup>6</sup>; 7pt scale)
2. Do you think [*Gender Attribute - Name*] should apply for Member of Parliament for [*The participant's constituency*] constituency with their current qualifications? (Q67; binary)
  - a. Should [*Gender Attribute - Name*] apply for a lower level of elected office in [*The participant's constituency*] constituency? (Q68; Categorical)
3. Should [*Gender Attribute - Name*] focus on improving their financial resources or should [*Gender Attribute - Name*] spend time increasing their connections in the constituency to become a better candidate for Member of Parliament of [*The participant's constituency*] constituency. (Q70; Binary)
  - a. You said that [*Gender Attribute - Name*] should focus on improving their financial resources. What is the best way to improve their financial resources? Select all that apply. *Following this they are asked to rank their selection.* (Q71; categorical)
  - b. You said that [*Gender Attribute - Name*] should focus on improving their connections in the constituencies. What is the best way to improve their connections in the constituencies? *Following this they are asked to rank their selection.* (Q73; categorical)

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<sup>6</sup> Note: Only the first conjoint profile is questions are listed in the measures. The questions are repeated in the following profiles and will be analyzed identically.

**Table 1: Conjoint Attribute Table**

<b>Personal Financial Capacity</b>	
<i>Control</i>	[Blank]
<i>Visible No Control One</i>	Their family has a successful business
<i>Visible No Control Two</i>	Their family has multiple successful businesses
<i>Visible and Control Level One</i>	They own a successful business
<i>Visible and Control Level Two</i>	They own multiple successful businesses
<i>Negative</i>	Has financial challenges with other individuals
<b>Invested Financial Capacity</b>	
	[Blank]
<i>Visible No Control One</i>	Their family has financially sponsored the party structure
<i>Visible No Control Two</i>	Their family has financially sponsored the party structures and constituency development projects
<i>Visible and Control One</i>	They have personally financially sponsored party structure
<i>Visible and Control Two</i>	They have personally financially sponsored party structures and constituency development projects
<i>Negative</i>	Has financial challenges with the party
<b>Personal Organization Capacity</b>	
<i>Control</i>	[Blank]
<i>Visible No Control One</i>	Family is a leading member in an influential local organization
<i>Visible No Control Two</i>	Family is a leading member in many influential local organizations
<i>Visible and Control One</i>	They are a leading member in an influential local organization
<i>Visible and Control Two</i>	They are a leading member in many influential local organizations
<i>Negative</i>	Does not have any connections in the constituency
<b>Invested Organizational Capacity</b>	
<i>Basic</i>	[Blank]
<i>Visible No Control One</i>	Family has mobilized support for one election campaign
<i>Visible No Control Two</i>	Family has mobilized support for many election campaigns
<i>Visible and Control One</i>	They have personally mobilized support for one election campaign
<i>Visible and Control Two</i>	They have personally mobilized support for many election campaigns
<i>Negative</i>	Has not assisted with party mobilization or party events
<b>Marital Status</b>	
	[Blank]
	Married
	Married with two young kids
	Divorced
	Widowed
<b>Endorsement</b>	
	[Blank]
	Can deliver us the seat
	With some work can deliver us the seat
	With a tremendous amount of hard work, they might be able to deliver us the seat
<b>Gender</b>	
	Ms. Alice
	Mrs. Beatrice
	Mr. Albert
	Ms. Catherine
	Mrs. Cecilia
	Mr. Isaac
	Ms. Kelly
	Mrs. Helene
	Mr. Matthew
	Ms. Francine
	Mrs. Maria
	Mr. Harrison

## 6. Planned Analysis and Expectations

In Table 2, I lay out which survey questions will be used to test the hypotheses presented in the theoretical framework section. In this section, I additionally discuss the planned tests and expectations for the vignette and conjoint experiment. Following this, I note additional tests planned for the observational data analysis and expected heterogeneous treatment effects.

**Table 2: Hypotheses and Related Survey Questions – Experimental & Observational**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Survey Questions<sup>7</sup></b>
H1: Women candidates are less likely to be selected than male candidates	Q66 – Q67
H2: Women candidates are asked to meet higher qualifications than male candidates.	Q40/Q52; Q41/Q53; Q43/Q55; Q47/Q59; Q66 – Q67
<b><i>Financial</i></b>	
H3: Women candidates are more likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they have greater financial resources.	Q66 – Q68
H4: Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not display independent control of their financial resources.	Q66 – Q68
H5: Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not visibly display their financial resources.	Q66 – Q68
H6: Local party members are more likely to prioritize financial resources when evaluating candidates compared to national party members	Q66 – Q72
<b><i>Organizational</i></b>	
H7: Women candidates are more likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they have greater organizational capacities.	Q66 – Q68
H8: Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not visibly display their organizational resources.	Q66 – Q68
H9: Women candidates are less likely to be selected than equally qualified male candidates if they do not display independent control of their organizational capacities.	Q66 – Q68
H10: National party members are more likely to prioritize organizational capacities when evaluating candidates compared to local party members.	Q66 – Q72

<sup>7</sup> Note: Only the first conjoint profile is recorded in Table 2. The questions are repeated in the following profiles and will be analyzed identically.

There are additional hypotheses that while not core to theory posited here, are general expectations or questions commonly discussed in the women in politics literature. These hypotheses are listed in Table 3 with the corresponding survey question that will be operationalized to test them.

**Table 3: Additional Hypotheses to Test**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Survey Questions</b>
H11: Women candidates will have to be more educated than male candidates to be considered qualified.	Q40/Q52
H12: Women candidates will have to conform to social norms more than male candidates to be considered qualified.	Q45/Q57; Q124
H13: Women candidates will have to belong to more organized than male candidates to be considered qualified.	Q49/
H14: Women candidates will be expected to spend more on their political campaigns than male candidates.	Q46/Q58
H15: Women candidates will be expected to have more assets than male candidates in order to be perceived as qualified to run for office.	Q47/Q59
H16: Women candidates will have to have more political experience than male candidates in order to be perceived as qualified to run for office	Q41/Q53
H17: Women candidates will have to have more sources of support than male candidates in order to be perceived as qualified to run for office	Q43/Q55
H18: Men will hold more sexist opinions than women	Q122
H19: Party members believe that being a successful candidate is more difficult for women than for men.	Q126
H20: Aspirants believe that being a successful candidate is more difficult for women than for men.	Q126
H21: National level party members are more likely than local level party members to believe that the current selection process is the best way to pick candidates	Q128

### ***6.1 Vignette Experiment***

For the vignette experiment, where candidate gender was randomized, I intend to conduct a difference-of-means test to demonstrate the different responses to the outcome measures based on which treatment the participant received by calculating the average treatment effect (ATE). The male name, Mr. Albert, will be treated as the control, and the female name, Ms. Alice, will be treated as the treatment. No pure control (i.e. no gender) was used as in reality the gender of a candidate is always known.

1. Q40 vs. Q52
  - a. Question: What level of education should Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert have...
  - b. Outcome: Ordinal Variable
  - c. Expectation: Participants will recommend a higher level of education for Ms. Angela than Mr. Albert [*Hypothesis 11*]
  - d. Test:  $\text{Mean}(Q40) > \text{Mean}(Q52)$
2. Q41 vs. Q53
  - a. Question: What level of political experience should Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert have...
  - b. Outcome: Categorical Check All
  - c. Expectation: Participations will recommend (check more) items for Ms. Angela to do than Mr. Albert. [*Hypothesis 2 & 16*]
  - d. Test:
    - i.  $\text{Mean}(\text{Count of Q41}) > \text{Mean}(\text{Count of Q53})$
    - ii.  $\text{Mean}(Q41.1) > \text{Mean}(Q53.1)$
    - iii.  $\text{Mean}(Q41.2) > \text{Mean}(Q53.2)$
    - iv.  $\text{Mean}(Q41.3) > \text{Mean}(Q53.3)$
    - v.  $\text{Mean}(Q41.4) > \text{Mean}(Q53.4)$
3. Q43 vs. Q55
  - a. Question What sources of support should Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert have...
  - b. Outcome: Categorical Check All
  - c. Expectation: Participations will recommend (check more) items for Ms. Angela to do than Mr. Albert [*Hypothesis 2 & 17*]
  - d. Test:
    - i.  $\text{Mean}(\text{Count of Q43}) > \text{Mean}(\text{Count of Q55})$
    - ii.  $\text{Mean}(Q43.1) > \text{Mean}(Q55.1)$
    - iii.  $\text{Mean}(Q43.2) > \text{Mean}(Q55.2)$
    - iv.  $\text{Mean}(Q43.3) > \text{Mean}(Q55.3)$
    - v.  $\text{Mean}(Q43.4) > \text{Mean}(Q55.4)$
4. Q45 vs. Q57
  - a. Question: What would the ideal family situation for Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert...
  - b. Outcome: Categorical
  - c. Expectation: Participants will consistently recommend that Ms. Angela have family situations that correspond with traditional norms of gender roles (i.e be/been married with raised children); these recommendations will be mirrored for Mr. Albert. [*Hypotheses 11*]
  - d. Test;
    - i. Within Treatment Group:
      1. [non-conforming family types]  $\text{Mean}(Q45.1) + \text{Mean}(Q45.3) <$   
[conforming family types]  $\text{Mean}(Q45.1) + \text{Mean}(Q45.3)$
    - ii. Within Control Group:
      1. [non-conforming family types]  $\text{Mean}(Q57.1) + \text{Mean}(Q57.3) =$   
[conforming family types]  $\text{Mean}(Q57.1) + \text{Mean}(Q57.3)$
    - iii. Comparing Treatment and control
      1. [conforming family types]  $\text{Mean}(Q45.1) + \text{Mean}(Q45.3) >$

[conforming family types]      Mean(Q57.1) + Mean (Q57.3)

5. Q46 vs. Q58
  - a. Question: How much money would you advise Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert...
  - b. Outcome: Categorical – Ordered
  - c. Expectation: Participants will recommend that Ms. Angela have more money than Mr. Albert [*Hypothesis 14*]
  - d. Test:  $\text{Mean}(Q46) > \text{Mean}(Q58)$
6. Q47 vs. Q59
  - a. Question: What assets do you think Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert...
  - b. Outcome: Categorical – Check All
  - c. Expectation: Participants will recommend that Ms. Angela have more assets than Mr. Albert [*Hypothesis 15*]
  - d. Test:
    - i.  $\text{Mean}(\text{Count of } Q47) > \text{Mean}(\text{Count of } Q59)$
    - ii.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.1) > \text{Mean}(Q59.1)$
    - iii.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.2) > \text{Mean}(Q59.2)$
    - iv.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.3) > \text{Mean}(Q59.3)$
    - v.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.4) > \text{Mean}(Q59.4)$
    - vi.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.5) > \text{Mean}(Q59.5)$
    - vii.  $\text{Mean}(Q47.6) > \text{Mean}(Q59.6)$
7. Q49 vs. Q61
  - a. Question: What organizations should Ms. Angela join before running for Member of Parliament
  - b. Outcome: Categorical – Check All
  - c. Expectation: Participants will recommend that Ms. Angela belong to more organizations than Mr. Albert [*Hypothesis 13*]
  - d. Test:
    - i.  $\text{Mean}(\text{Count of } Q49) > \text{Mean}(\text{Count of } Q61)$
    - ii.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.1) > \text{Mean}(Q61.1)$
    - iii.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.2) > \text{Mean}(Q61.2)$
    - iv.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.3) > \text{Mean}(Q61.3)$
    - v.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.4) > \text{Mean}(Q61.4)$
    - vi.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.5) > \text{Mean}(Q61.5)$
    - vii.  $\text{Mean}(Q49.6) > \text{Mean}(Q61.6)$

## 6.2 Conjoint Experiment

The conjoint will be analyzed following Hainmueller et al. (2014) by calculating the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and the average component interaction effect (ACIE). I will use the fully non-parametric linear regression estimator presented in Hainmueller et al. (2014), and cluster the standard errors derived from the estimation at the respondent level. The survey presented participants with 6 profiles and the following outcomes will be used to construct the outcome variables: *Candidate Rating (7pt Scale)*; *Should they run (binary)*; *Other Position (collapsed into a binary AND 3pt scale)*; *Improvement Financial vs. Organization (binary)*. The following questions in the conjoint profiles will be analyzed first with a comparison of means, following the hypotheses set out in the theoretical framework, and with a multinomial regression, treating attributes as treatment assignments.

In line with current critiques on the potential biases of inference resulting from relying on the AMCE (Scott F Abramson, Working Paper), this analysis will place the results in the appropriate context of the representative selectorate. Additionally, to test the potential error Abramson and Magazinnik (Working Paper) highlight with the intensity of the minority outweighing the true but more moderate beliefs of the majority, I will use sub-group analyses as robustness checks. Following insights in the literature and insights from my fieldwork, I suggest that specific subgroups (women, aspirants, local vs. national party selectorates) could have varying intensities in their preferences that could potentially cause the problem highlighted by Abramson and Magazinnik (Working Paper). It is also important to note that given the party selectorate setting, where evaluations are conducted in a group, it is plausible that the intensity of the minority could overrun the moderate opinions of the majority. Therefore, given that the minority could move the majority, the conjoint conforms to the ideal experimental design to test preferences of the party selectorate.

**Table 3: Planned Conjoint Subgroup Analyses**

<b>Planned Conjoint Analysis</b>	<b>Subset</b>
Do any attributes have an effect on candidate evaluation for all party selectorates and aspirants?	Whole Sample
Do any attributes have a unique effect on candidate evaluation for all party selectorates?	Party Selectorates (Q9- Q16)
Do any attributes have a unique effect on candidate evaluation for women?	Gender (Q160)
Do any attributes have a unique effect on candidate evaluation for local level party selectorates?	Party Selectorates - Level (Q9- Q16)
Do any attributes have a unique effect on candidate evaluation for national level party selectorates?	Party Selectorates - Level (Q9- Q16)

### 6.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The theory in this study proposed a heterogeneous treatment effect: that the local level party members will be more affected by a candidate's financial capacity and that higher-level party members will be more affected by a candidate's organizational capacity. Therefore, I plan to do a split sample analysis by party position. Additionally, the survey measures a participant's Benevolent, Hostile, and Ambivalent Sexism following Glick and Fiske (Glick & Fiske, 2018). It is important to note that the measure was modified to be applicable and relevant to the Zambian context (see pg. 45 – 46 of the survey). I will use this measure to investigate whether individuals who have different levels of sexism react to the experimental treatments. Further, heterogeneous treatment effects that are largely proposed by various literatures and will be investigated have been listed in Table 4.

**Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Groups**

<b>Heterogeneous Treatment Groups*</b>	Survey Question
Party Level	Q9- Q16
Candidate Selection Type (Open/Secret Ballot)	Q26
Ambivalent Sexism Measure - Sexism	Q122 – Q125
Gender	Q160
Political Experience	Q4; Q8 – Q20; Q22- Q24; Q32-Q36
Constituency - Prior Female Candidacy	Q5
Ethnicity	Q156 Q157
Age	Q147
Education	Q148
Wealth	Q151
Patronage Expectation	Q140 – Q145
Political Party	Q6 - 8
Marital Status	Q152 – Q155
Religion	Q158 -Q159

\*Note: Order reflects theorized importance of heterogeneous groups

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